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Abstract. In social network analysis, there is a common perception that influence is relevant
to determine the global behavior of the society and thus it can be used to enforce cooperation
by targeting an adequate initial set of individuals or to analyze global choice processes. Here we
propose centrality measures that can be used to analyze the relevance of the actors in process
related to spread of influence. In [39] it was considered a multiagent system in which the agents are
eager to perform a collective task depending on the perception of the willingness to perform the
task of other individuals. The setting is modeled using a notion of simple games called influence
games. Those games are defined on graphs were the nodes are labeled by their influence threshold
and the spread of influence between its nodes is used to determine whether a coalition is winning
or not.
Influence games provide tools to measure the importance of the actors of a social network by means
of classic power indices and provide a framework to consider new centrality criteria. In this paper
we consider two of the most classical power indices, i.e., Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices, as
centrality measures for social networks in influence games. Although there is some work related to
specific scenarios of game-theoretic networks, here we use such indices as centrality measures in
any social network where the spread of influence phenomenon can be applied. Further, we define
new centrality measures such as satisfaction and effort that, as far as we know, have not been
considered so far.
Besides the definition we perform a comparison of the proposed measures with other three classic
centrality measures, degree, closeness and betweenness. To perform the comparison we consider
three social networks. We show that in some cases our measurements provide centrality hierarchies
similar to those of other measures, while in other cases provide different hierarchies.
Keywords: Social Network, Centrality, Power index, Spread of Influence, Influence game, Simple
game
1 Introduction
Social network analysis is a multidisciplinary field related to sociology, computer science and mathemat-
ics, among other disciplines. In the last decades the field has grown extensively with the development of
Internet and the emergence of online social networks. One of the most studied concepts in social network
analysis is centrality, that has to do with measuring how structurally important is an actor within a social
network [19,7,49]. There are several centrality measures that provide different relevance criteria for the
nodes within the network [55,35]. However, one of the major challenges for a successful implementation
of network management activities, such as viral marketing, is the identification of key persons with a
central structural position within the network. For this purpose, social network analysis provides a lot
of measures for quantifying a member’s interconnectedness within social networks, providing strongly
differing results with respect to the quality of the different centrality measures. See [34] for a critical
review in this context.
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In this paper we consider four different centrality measures, focused directly on these kind of appli-
cations, where trends, ideas, fashions, etc. can be propagated through the network starting from a given
set of actors. The first two measures correspond to classic power indices coming from the field of simple
games and voting theory, namely the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices, which can be bring
to this centrality context through the use of influence games [39], a way to represent simple games as
if they were social networks. There are some previous work where the Shapley-Shubik index is used as
centrality measure for specific game-theoretic networks [50,38], but as far as we know, the Banzhaf index
has not been used before for this proposal.
The other two measures are the effort and the satisfaction, new centrality measures that take advan-
tage directly from the notion of influence games. While effort’s centrality measures the effort required to
make the social network follow the opinion of an individual, satisfaction’s centrality measures the level of
satisfaction of each individual, so that it is influential if and only if it is taken into account. Besides the
necessary definitions, we perform an experimental comparison between these new centrality measures
and three classic ones, which are degree, closeness and betweenness. We compare them on some simple
real social networks for which a computation can be performed in reasonable time.
Influence games are strongly related with the notion of spread of influence, which describes the ways
in which people influence each other through their interactions in a social network. This is certainly an
intuitive and also well known phenomenon in social network analysis [16] that is studied in other topics
of this area, like the homophily phenomenon [37,49]. It has also received a lot of attention in the last
decade in the computer science community, a well as in other areas like viral marketing [1,29,16].
Motivated by viral marketing and other applications, the problem that has been usually studied is
the influence maximization problem, initially introduced by [14,44] and further developed in [32,17]. This
problem addresses the question of finding a set with at most k players having maximum influence, and
it is NP-hard [14], unless additional restrictions are considered, in which case some generality of the
problem is lost [44]. Two general models for spread of influence were defined in [32]: the first one is the
linear threshold model, based in the first ideas of [25,46], and the second one is the independent cascade
model, created in the context of marketing by [23,24]. Models for influence spread in the presence of
multiple competing products have also been proposed and analyzed [5,8,1]. In such a setting there is
also work done towards analyzing the problem from the point of view of non-cooperative game theory.
Non-cooperative influence games were defined in 2011 by Irfan and Ortiz [28]. Those games, however,
analyze the strategic aspects of two firms competing on the social network and differ from our proposal.
Regarding power indices, in simple game theory a power index is a measure of the importance of the
players of a game. They have been extensively studied in voting systems, sociology and economics. Most
studies are related to voting systems [2], analyzing the computational complexity of calculating power
indices in certain subclasses of simple games [11], defining new power indices to represent the relevance of
players under different considerations [22], analogously to the works which define new centrality measures,
like the present one. As far as we know, this is the first approach to apply power indices as centrality
measures for social networks. In fact, traditional centrality measures are not focused on social networks
contemplating spread of influence processes. However, the idea of using power indices as measures in
networks is not new. The interested reader is referred to [3] for studies concerning power indices in flow
networks and to [53,54] for measurements of power and satisfaction in societies.
On the other hand, our satisfaction measure is inspired on the concept of opinion leadership, which
has received considerable attention in sociology and marketing. It rose out of the two-step flow of commu-
nication theory introduced by [31,36]. The existence —or non-existence— of opinion leaders in a society
has a considerable impact on environments of marketing and politics. These issues have been addressed
recently on theoretical grounds by [53,54]. In these papers the authors consider a society formed by a
social network with two layers, leaders and followers —they also consider independent actors, who are
not related to the other actors in the network—, and they introduce the measures of satisfaction and
power. The first one measures the ability of each actor “to affect the state of the society concerning a
specific outcome”, while the second tells us “to which degree members of the society can be expected to
end up with an outcome that they like”. Interestingly, influence games can be saw as a generalization
of this leader-follower model, so that a version of the satisfaction measure can be used as a centrality
measure for this work. We do not consider here the measure of power, because it is very similar to that
of satisfaction and provides similar results.
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A social network can be represented by a graph where each node is an actor, individual, agent or
player, and each edge connecting two nodes represents an interpersonal tie between the respective actors.
These graphs, depending on what we want to represent and on the complexity of the system, may be
directed or undirected, and be labeled or not. For instance, in graphs with labeled edges, high weights
on edges may mean strong interpersonal ties between the respective actors, and viceversa. In some cases,
the network can also be dynamic, changing its topology or properties over time.
In this paper, we consider static networks, defined beforehand, so that the number of nodes remains
unchanged and there is no creation, deletion nor strengthening of interpersonal ties. We also consider
directed edges, so that they also represent the degree of influence of one actor over another one.
We consider three simple real social networks to perform a comparison on the proposed centrality
measures with some traditional ones. The first one, monkeys’ interaction, corresponds to a unlabeled and
undirected graph [18,35]; the second one, dining-table partners, is an edge-labeled directed graph [40,12];
and the third one, student Government discussion, is an edge-labeled and vertex-labeled directed graph
[26,12]. For the first two cases we take some additional considerations, while the last one corresponds
exactly to an influence game. Our experimental results do not contradict the relevance criteria provided
by traditional centrality measures like degree centrality, closeness or betweenness. In some cases such
measurements are similar to our measurements, returning expected results for a reasonable measure
of centrality. However, there are also cases where the results have been quite different from traditional
measures, which may also differ significantly, as is the case of the Student Government discussion network,
or the Monkeys’ interaction network for the effort centrality measure. For these cases, new reasonable
centrality measures provide new approaches and insights for social network analysis. Moreover, the new
centrality measures could be very eloquent for edge-labeled and vertex-labeled directed graphs, which is
not supported by most measures of centrality [6].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall concepts related to social networks and
traditional centrality measures. In Section 3 we define the main concepts needed for our results, including
our notion of influence game, which relates social networks with voting theory. In Section 4 we define
some classic power indices, explaining why they can be consider as centrality measures, and we define
a new centrality measure not based on power indices, the effort centrality measure. In Section 5 we
compare all these new centrality measures with others on real and known cases of study. We finish with
some conclusions and future work.
2 Preliminars
A social network is an edge-labeled graph (G,w), where G = (V,E) is a graph without loops, V is the set
of nodes representing individual, actors, players, etc., E is the set of edges representing interpersonal ties
between actors, and w : E → N is a weight function which assigns a weight to every edge, representing
the strength of each interpersonal tie. An actor i ∈ V has influence over another j ∈ V iff (i, j) ∈ E.
The graph G could be directed or undirected, and can have weighted nodes or not. Undirected graphs
can be treated as symmetric directed graphs, considering that an undirected edge {i, j} is the same that
two directed edges (i, j) and (j, i).
The centrality of a node refers to its relative importance inside of a network, and depends of structural
aspects at a global level. Centrality is one of the most studied concepts in network analysis, and since
the late 1970s in social network analysis [19,20]. There are several centrality measures [33] that provide
different importance criteria to the nodes. Let i ∈ V be an actor, three of the most well-known and widely
applied are degree centrality, closeness centrality and betweenness centrality [55], which in a normalized
version are defined as follows [35]:
– Degree centrality (CD): It is based on the indegree or outdegree of each actor, i.e.,
C−D(i) =
deg−(i)
n− 1
or C+D(i) =
deg+(i)
n− 1
.
where deg−(i) = |{j ∈ V | (j, i) ∈ E}| is the number of vertices that goes to i, and deg+(i) =
|{j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E}| is the number of vertices that goes from i. For undirected networks, deg(i) =
deg−(i) = deg+(i), so CD is without distinction C
−
D and C
+
D.
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– Closeness centrality (CC): It is based on the inverse of the sum of shortest paths from i to the other
actors, i.e., let D be the usual distance matrix of the network,
CC(i) =
n− 1∑
i6=j(D)ij
.
If there is no path from i to j, we assume that (D)ij = n.
– Betweenness centrality (CB): Let bjk the number of shortest paths from the node j until k, and bjik
the number of these shortest paths that pass through i, then
CB(i) =
1
(n− 1)(n− 2)
∑
j 6=k
bjik
bjk
.
If there is no path from j to k, we assume
bjik
bjk
= 0.
There are several centrality measures based on the previous ones, such as the Katz centrality, Bonacich
centrality, Hubbell centrality, Newman betweenness, between others [49]. The differences between these
variations are few, and do not involve a change of paradigm. Additionaly, there are other measures based
on other ideas, like Eigenvector and Alpha centrality [49]. Moreover, some of these measures were initially
defined only for undirected graphs, but there also exist generalizations which consider weighted edges
[48,42]. However, most of them do not consider graphs with weighted nodes, which is necessary for our
notion of spread of influence phenomenon.
3 Social networks as simple games
The following definition is based on the linear threshold model [25,46,32]. We follow notation from [39].
Definition 1. An influence graph is a tuple (G,w, f) where (G,w) is a social network and f : V → N
is a labeling function that quantifies how influenciable each actor is.
Given an influence graph (G,w, f) and an initial activation set X ⊆ V , the spread of influence is
denoted by F (X), where F (X) ⊆ V is formed by the actors activated through an iterative process in
which initially only the nodes in X are activated. Let be F t(X) the set of nodes activated at some
iteration t, then at the next t+ 1 iteration a node i ∈ V will be activated iff:
∑
j∈F t(X)
w((j, i)) ≥ f(i).
In other words, a node i is activated when the weights’ sum of the activated nodes connected to this
node i is greater or equals to its capacity of influence. The process stops when no additional activation
occurs, so that F (X) = F 1(X) ∪ . . . ∪ F k(X), where k ≤ n.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows the spread of influence F (X) in an influence graph from the initial activation
X = {a}. In the first step we obtain F 1(X) = {a, c}, and in the second step —the last one—, F 2(X) =
{a, c, d}.
X = {a}
1
a
1
b
1
c
4
d
1
2 3 1
1
F 1(X) = {a, c}
1
a
1
b
1
c
4
d
1
2 3 1
1
F 2(X) = {a, c, d}
1
a
1
b
1
c
4
d
1
2 3 1
1
Fig. 1. Spread of influence —colored nodes— from the initial activation X = {a}.
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Now we define simple games, a useful mathematical structure used in voting theory, cooperative game
theory, and many other topics like hypergraphs or monotone Boolean functions [51,2,45].
Definition 2. A simple game is a tuple (N,W) where N is a finite set of players and W is a monotonic
family of subsets of N formed by the winning coalitions, such that if X ∈ W and X ⊆ Z, then Z ∈ W.
Based on simple games, we use a simplified definition of the given by [39], considering that all the
nodes can be initially activated.
Definition 3. An influence game is a tuple (G,w, f, q) where (G,w, f) is an influence graph and q is a
quota 0 ≤ q ≤ |V |+ 1. X ⊆ V is a winning coalition iff |F (X)| ≥ q, otherwise X is a losing coalition.
Since now, we assume that N = V and n = |N |. Furthermore, we assume that for each isolated
node i, f(i) tends to infinity, which means that it can not be convinced in any way. Note that influence
games are also monotonic, because for any X ⊆ V , i ∈ V , if |F (X)| ≥ q then |F (X ∪ {i})| ≥ q, and
if |F (X)| < q then |F (X\{i})| < q. Thus, it is clear that every influence game is a simple game. The
opposite is also true as it was shown by [39].
4 Power indices and new centrality measures
A power index is a measure of the importance of the players of a game. Power indices have been extensively
studied in voting systems, sociology and economics. Most studies are related to voting systems [2],
analyzing the computational complexity of calculating power indices in certain subclasses of simple games
[11], defining new power indices to represent the relevance of players under different considerations [22],
analogously to the works which define new centrality measures, like the present one.
The main power indices are the Banzhaf index [4] —also called Penrose-Banzhaf index [43]— and the
Shapley-Shubik index [47]. Let (N,W) be a simple game, and let Ci = {S ∈ W ;S\{i} /∈ W} be the set
of blocking coalitions for each i ∈ N . A player is critic in a coalition if that coalition is a blocking. The
Banzhaf value of i is
η(i) = |Ci|
and the Shapley-Shubik value of i is
κ(i) =
∑
S∈Ci
(|S| − 1)! (n− |S|)!
The normalized versions give the Banzhaf index (Bz) and the Shapley-Shubik index (SS), respectively,
Bz(i) =
η(i)∑
i∈N η(i)
and SS(i) =
κ(i)
n!
.
Note that both power indices (seen as measures), like CB , correspond to medial measures in the sense
that they take as reference the sets of actors which pass through a given node instead of a given node
which starts or ends some paths through the network, like it succeed with the radial measures as CD or
CC [49].
Both power indices can be considered as centrality measures because an actor is more central in the
network while more necessary is for generating of winning coalitions.
Example 2. Lets consider the influence game given by the influence graph of Figure 1 and a quota q = n.
Player b is the unique critic player (i.e., b belongs to any winning coalition), so η(b) = 8 and Bz(b) = 1,
while η(j) = 0 and Bz(j) = 0 for j ∈ {a, c, d}. Further, as |{b}| = 1, |{b, a}| = |{b, c}| = |{b, d}| = 2,
|{b, a, c}| = |{b, a, d}| = |{b, c, d}| = 3 and |{b, a, c, d}| = 4, then κ(b) = 24 and SS(b) = 1, while SS(j) = 0
for j ∈ {a, c, d}.
The interested reader can see [21] and [11] to consider other power indices, i.e., the Deegan-Packel
index [13], the Holler index [27], the Coleman indices [10] or the Johnston index [30] among many others.
On the other hand, influence games can also provide other new criteria to determine measures of
centrality. For instance, to consider the weights of the nodes of the smaller coalition in which an individual
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can be contained: Let be w(S) =
∑
i∈S f(i) the sum of the weights of the nodes of a given coalition
S ⊆ N , we define the minimum effort required by the system to choose the initial activation that
contains a required individual, in such a way that this activation is a winning coalition:
Effort(i) = min{w(S);S ∪ {i} ∈ W}.
When we apply such concept to influence games setting a quota q then the effort is:
Effort(i) = min{w(S);F (S ∪ {i}) ≥ q}.
Note that while greater is the required effort for a node, this node should be less central. Therefore,
we define the normalized version of the effort centrality measure (CE) as follows:
CE(i) =
w(N) − Effort(i)
w(N)
.
Example 3. For the same influence game of Example 2, Effort(b) = 1, Effort(a) = Effort(c) = 2 and
Effort(d) = 5, so CE(b) = 6/7 > CE(a) = CE(c) = 5/7 > CE(d) = 2/7.
Moreover, [53,54] define a satisfaction score to measure the ability to affect the state of an opinion
leader-follower collective choice situation. Every instance of this model can be saw as an influence game
formed by isolated nodes and a bipartite graph with two levels, such that there are only directed edges
pointing from one level to the other. Without going into detail on this model, just note that influence
games are a generalization of this. Thus, we define the satisfaction centrality measure (CS), based on the
satisfaction score, as follows. Let (G,w, f, q) be an influence game, Wi = {X ⊆ V (G); i ∈ X,F (X) ≥ q}
and L−i = {X ⊆ V (G); i /∈ X,F (X) < q}, then:
CS(i) =
|Wi|+ |L−i|
2n
.
It is interesting to note that this satisfaction score, and therefore the new satisfaction measure, leaving
aside losing coalitions would be the same that the well known solution concepts called Chow parameters
[9,15], deeply related with the Holler index [27].
Note that we could define other measures based on CE or CS , but they probably provide similar or
less interesting results. For instance, we could also define the effort without weights, based on the width
parameter [2]:
Width(i) = min{|S|;F (S ∪ {i}) ≥ q}.
and then to consider
CW (i) =
n− Width(i)
n
.
However, this measure does not provide very interesting results, so it is not considered in this work.
5 Cases of study
We consider three simple real social networks to compare the new centrality measures Bz, SS, CE and
CS , with some traditional ones, CD, CC and CB. The first one, monkeys’ interaction, corresponds to a
unlabeled and undirected graph; the second one, dining-table partners, is an edge-labeled directed graph;
and the third one, student Government discussion, is an edge-labeled and vertex-labeled directed graph.
For the first two cases we will take some additional considerations, while the last one corresponds exactly
to an influence game as Definition 3.
5.1 Monkeys’ interaction
In [18] is provided a network which represents the real interactions amongst a group of 20 monkeys
observed during three months next to a river. It corresponds to an undirected graph where an edge
{i, j} exists when monkeys i and j were witnessed together in the river. The graph is formed by 6
isolated nodes and a connected component of 14 nodes, as showed Figure 2. The authors considered the
6
13
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
17
2 6 16 18 19 20
Fig. 2. Social network of monkeys recorded by [18] and also used by [35].
centrality measures CD, CC and CB , as well as generalized versions of these measures for groups instead
of individuals. Years later, [35] use the same network to compare the previous results with the measure
called information centrality.
In order to analize this network ((V,E), w) we assume that every undirected edge {i, j} with i, j ∈ V
represents in fact two arcs (i, j) and (j, i) of E, so the graph is symmetric. Moreover, we assume that
the weight function is defined by w(e) = 1, for all e ∈ E. In the context of our work, this means that a
monkey can influence and be influenced by other monkey iff they have interacted before.
To define from here an influence game we use the quota q = 14, which corresponds to the maximum
spread of influence which can be obtained from a monkey. This helps to obtain lower measures in isolated
nodes, as it is to be expected from a centrality measure.
Now we consider the following natural labeling functions for every node i ∈ V :
– Case 1 (C1): Minimum influence required to convincement, f(i) = 1.
– Case 2 (C2): Average influence required to convincement, f(i) = ⌈deg(i)/2⌉.
– Case 3 (C3): Majority influence required to convincement, f(i) = ⌊deg(i)/2⌋+ 1.
– Case 4 (C4): Maximum influence required to convincement, f(i) = deg(i).
The Bz, SS, CE and CS measures have been computed for all these cases: See Table 1. Note that all
columns of the tables in this paper use a sufficient number of significant digits to distinguish those values
which are really different, from the ones that are equal. Hence, only isolated nodes for Bz, SS and CE ,
as well as the last column of CE assume a score exactly equal to zero.
Note that if we consider minimum influence required to convincement —columns Bz-C1, SS-C1, CE-
C1 and CS-C1—, then the new measures are not a good representatives, because as the spread of influence
is fluid, i.e. actors does not require too many restrictions to form winning coalitions, then all the non-
isolated nodes have the same value. However, for the other cases, when differences between influences
are relevant, only the pair of monkeys (10, 17) and (13, 15) assume the same value for Bz, SS and CS ,
allowing a more relevant hierarchization than for the other measures.
Leaving aside the case 1 for the new measures, there are other similarities between traditional mea-
sures and new ones. In the same way than traditional measures, the most central monkey for Bz, SS and
CS is 3. The second score is for monkey 12, except for Bz-C3 and SS-C3, where it is replaced by monkeys
13 and 15. Third score is for monkeys 13 and 15, except for Bz-C3 and SS-C3, where they are replaced,
respectively, by monkey 14 and monkey 12, and for CS-C4, where they are replaced by monkey 8. Finally,
as expected, for all cases the less central non-isolated monkey is monkey 9, except for CS-C2, in which
case is monkey 5. Similarities between some traditional measures and some of the new ones are shown
in Figure 3. This also holds for CS , although the scores are always greater.
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On the other hand, CE provides a different criterion of centrality, for instance, now monkey 3 is the
less central for CE-C2.
Bz SS CE CS
Node CD CC CB C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4
1 0.21 0.134 0.006 0.07 0.038 0.0708 0.0885 0.07 0.025 0.068 0.075 0.9 0.43 0.14 0 0.501 0.521 0.575 0.598
2 0.00 0.050 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.00 0.00 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
3 0.68 0.143 0.260 0.07 0.156 0.1214 0.1730 0.07 0.219 0.150 0.192 0.9 0.36 0.07 0 0.501 0.589 0.644 0.736
4 0.16 0.133 0.000 0.07 0.059 0.0673 0.0343 0.07 0.047 0.062 0.044 0.9 0.50 0.14 0 0.501 0.537 0.547 0.580
5 0.11 0.132 0.000 0.07 0.019 0.0373 0.0438 0.07 0.013 0.032 0.036 0.9 0.43 0.14 0 0.501 0.510 0.543 0.578
6 0.00 0.050 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.00 0.00 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
7 0.16 0.133 0.000 0.07 0.049 0.0497 0.0460 0.07 0.032 0.043 0.045 0.9 0.43 0.14 0 0.501 0.528 0.551 0.583
8 0.16 0.133 0.003 0.07 0.048 0.0282 0.0863 0.07 0.040 0.024 0.066 0.9 0.43 0.07 0 0.501 0.527 0.532 0.601
9 0.05 0.131 0.000 0.07 0.028 0.0281 0.0003 0.07 0.017 0.022 0.005 0.9 0.43 0.14 0 0.501 0.516 0.531 0.548
10 0.16 0.133 0.000 0.07 0.074 0.0538 0.0205 0.07 0.069 0.050 0.035 0.9 0.50 0.14 0 0.501 0.536 0.555 0.582
11 0.11 0.132 0.000 0.07 0.037 0.0470 0.0035 0.07 0.023 0.040 0.016 0.9 0.50 0.14 0 0.501 0.520 0.553 0.574
12 0.47 0.139 0.060 0.07 0.154 0.1004 0.1671 0.07 0.180 0.107 0.160 0.9 0.43 0.14 0 0.501 0.580 0.604 0.625
13 0.32 0.136 0.011 0.07 0.091 0.1197 0.1395 0.07 0.096 0.125 0.116 0.9 0.43 0.07 0 0.501 0.546 0.586 0.596
14 0.21 0.134 0.000 0.07 0.081 0.1028 0.0375 0.07 0.075 0.100 0.055 0.9 0.50 0.14 0 0.501 0.541 0.569 0.584
15 0.32 0.136 0.011 0.07 0.091 0.1197 0.1395 0.07 0.096 0.125 0.116 0.9 0.43 0.07 0 0.501 0.546 0.586 0.596
16 0.00 0.050 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.00 0.00 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
17 0.16 0.133 0.000 0.07 0.074 0.0538 0.0205 0.07 0.069 0.050 0.035 0.9 0.50 0.14 0 0.501 0.536 0.555 0.582
18 0.00 0.050 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.00 0.00 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
19 0.00 0.050 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.00 0.00 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
20 0.00 0.050 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.00 0.00 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Table 1. Comparison of centrality measures for the Monkeys’ interaction network. The three more central values
of some measures are highlighted in bold. We consider a quota q = 14.
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Fig. 3. Similarities between Bz-C4, SS-C4, CC and CB measures for Monkeys’ interaction network.
5.2 Dining-table partners
A second real network is illustrated in Figure 4. It was firstly provided by a sociometric research of [40]
and, years later, it was also used by [12] to be handled and displayed by a computational application.
It represents the companion preferences of 26 girls living in one cottage at a New York state training
school. Each girl was asked about who prefers as dining-table partner in first and second place. Thus,
each girl is represented by a node, and there is a directed edge (i, j) per each girl i prefering girl j as
dining-table partner. Every node has an outdegree equal to 2: edges with weight 1 denote the first option
of the girl, and edges with weight 2 denote her second option.
We could assume that a girl has some ability to influence over another one which has chosen her
as a partner. Figure 4 also shows the corresponding network of this influence game, reversing each arc
(i, j) by (j, i), so that a node points to another when the first one has some influence over the second
one. Further, the weights of the edges must be exchanged, so that an original edge (i, j) with weight 1
now becomes in an edge (j, i) with weight 2, and viceversa. This is due to a girl has more influence over
another one if that other has chosen her in first place rather than in second place. Of course, now every
node has an indegree equal to 2: one edge with weight 1 and the other with weight 2.
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Fig. 4. Original network for dining-table partners [40,12], and the adaptation to influence graph.
Instead of the Monkeys’ interaction network, here there is no isolated nodes, but we can still obtaining
scores for Bz and SS measures equal to zero. For instance, see the columns of Bz-C1 and SS-C1 on Table 2.
A common voting system is the one of absolute majority, in which an option wins whether it has
more than the half of the votes. According to this idea, we consider for our experiments a quota q = 14,
so that a coalition is considered successful or winning if and only if through its spread of influence, this
coalition achieves to convince most of the girls.
For every node i ∈ V , we consider the following reasonable labeling functions:
– Case 1 (C1): Minimum influence required to convincement, f(i) = 1.
– Case 2 (C2): Average influence required to convincement, f(i) = 2.
– Case 3 (C3): Maximum influence required to convincement, f(i) = 3.
The comparison between traditional measures and the Bz, SS, CE and CS measures are shown on Table 2.
Bz SS CE CS
Node C−
D
C+
D
CC CB C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
1 0.08 0.04 0.0400 0.035 0.00 0.028 0.0274 0.0000 0.0103 0.0259 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500000 0.5024 0.5300
2 0.08 0.04 0.0400 0.033 0.00 0.028 0.0274 0.0000 0.0103 0.0259 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500000 0.5024 0.5300
3 0.08 0.08 0.2273 0.072 0.08 0.008 0.0302 0.0832 0.0014 0.0331 0.96 0.85 0.54 0.500217 0.5006 0.5329
4 0.08 0.08 0.0473 0.039 0.00 0.028 0.0413 0.0000 0.0103 0.0383 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500000 0.5024 0.5451
5 0.08 0.12 0.0473 0.049 0.00 0.028 0.0452 0.0000 0.0103 0.0463 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500000 0.5024 0.5494
6 0.08 0.08 0.3165 0.102 0.08 0.043 0.0481 0.0832 0.0142 0.0473 0.96 0.85 0.42 0.500217 0.5036 0.5526
7 0.08 0.00 0.0385 0.015 0.01 0.024 0.0216 0.0003 0.0075 0.0176 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500027 0.5020 0.5236
8 0.08 0.04 0.0471 0.036 0.00 0.024 0.0278 0.0000 0.0075 0.0239 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500000 0.5020 0.5303
9 0.08 0.24 0.4902 0.232 0.08 0.027 0.0820 0.0832 0.0072 0.0965 0.96 0.85 0.54 0.500217 0.5023 0.5896
10 0.08 0.08 0.3378 0.089 0.08 0.104 0.0506 0.0832 0.1953 0.0578 0.96 0.92 0.54 0.500217 0.5089 0.5552
11 0.08 0.08 0.2778 0.107 0.08 0.008 0.0383 0.0832 0.0014 0.0410 0.96 0.85 0.54 0.500217 0.5006 0.5418
12 0.08 0.04 0.0452 0.052 0.00 0.004 0.0321 0.0001 0.0007 0.0292 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500004 0.5003 0.5350
13 0.08 0.16 0.0454 0.061 0.00 0.014 0.0500 0.0001 0.0041 0.0511 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500004 0.5012 0.5546
14 0.08 0.08 0.3571 0.083 0.08 0.104 0.0486 0.0832 0.1953 0.0465 0.96 0.92 0.42 0.500217 0.5089 0.5531
15 0.08 0.24 0.3906 0.145 0.08 0.104 0.0683 0.0832 0.1953 0.0755 0.96 0.92 0.54 0.500217 0.5089 0.5746
16 0.08 0.00 0.0385 0.025 0.00 0.015 0.0279 0.0000 0.0055 0.0256 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500000 0.5013 0.5305
17 0.08 0.33 0.0614 0.091 0.08 0.051 0.0469 0.0832 0.0232 0.0459 0.96 0.85 0.42 0.500217 0.5043 0.5512
18 0.08 0.12 0.3425 0.123 0.08 0.104 0.0404 0.0832 0.1953 0.0361 0.96 0.92 0.42 0.500217 0.5089 0.5442
19 0.08 0.08 0.0595 0.053 0.08 0.036 0.0356 0.0832 0.0126 0.0327 0.96 0.85 0.42 0.500217 0.5031 0.5389
20 0.08 0.12 0.3247 0.164 0.08 0.075 0.0394 0.0832 0.0413 0.0395 0.96 0.85 0.42 0.500217 0.5064 0.5430
21 0.08 0.08 0.0605 0.038 0.08 0.051 0.0457 0.0832 0.0232 0.0512 0.96 0.85 0.54 0.500217 0.5043 0.5499
22 0.08 0.04 0.0452 0.046 0.00 0.025 0.0325 0.0001 0.0082 0.0293 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500004 0.5021 0.5355
23 0.08 0.00 0.0385 0.027 0.00 0.011 0.0191 0.0000 0.0029 0.0173 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500000 0.5010 0.5208
24 0.08 0.08 0.0417 0.057 0.01 0.029 0.0324 0.0003 0.0083 0.0301 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500027 0.5025 0.5354
25 0.08 0.00 0.0385 0.020 0.01 0.024 0.0218 0.0003 0.0075 0.0187 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500027 0.5020 0.5239
26 0.08 0.00 0.0385 0.027 0.00 0.004 0.0197 0.0000 0.0007 0.0177 0.92 0.85 0.42 0.500000 0.5003 0.5215
Table 2. Comparison of centrality measures for the influence game version of the Dining-table partners network.
The three more central values of some measures are highlighted in bold. We consider a quota q = 14.
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Note that in this case, indegree centrality C−D does not provide any relevant information, because the
indegree for each node is always 2.
Similarly as it succeded in previous section, Bz-C1, SS-C1, CE-C1 and CS-C1 have a lot of nodes with
the same rank, but while increases the required influence to convincement, the values of the measures
are more diverse for the power indices and satisfaction centrality. Note that measures Bz-C2, SS-C2 and
CS-C2, as well as C
+
D and CC , have only some values that are repeated, but measures Bz-C3, SS-C3 and
CS-C3 have the same values only for girls 1 and 2. These girls are equivalent in this sense for all the other
measures except by CB , in which, however, together with CE , girls 23 and 26 have the same centrality.
The most central girls are highlighted in Table 2. Girl 15 has a high centrality in all measures, as well
as girl 9, except in CE-C2, as well as in Bz-C2 and SS-C2, where is far less central. Note that girl 13 is
fairly central exclusively in C+D , because despite of its high outdegree, only exist paths from this node to
another four, which is a severe restriction for all other measures considered.
Additionally, unlike traditional measures, girl 10 play an important role in our new measures because,
in spite of neither having a high outdegree nor having too short paths to more distant nodes, she plays an
essential role in the spread of influence to convince distant sets of girls, which in turn have no convincing
power over her.
Finally, note that as in the previous network —see Figure 5— measures Bz and SS produce similar
rankings. Moreover, it will be also fulfilled on the network of the next section. Otherwise, on the next
network the measure CE will produce more varied values than in this network and the previous one.
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Fig. 5. Similarities between Bz-C3, SS-C3, CC and CB measures for Dining-table partners network.
5.3 Student Government discussion
The last case of study that we analyze here starts with the social network illustrated in Figure 6. This
network represents the communication interactions among different members of the Student Government
at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia. Data were collected through personal interviews in 1992 and
published by [26], being used later by [12].
Every directed edge is a communication interaction and all of them have the same weight equal
to 1. Each node is a member of the Student Government, and unlike the previous cases, here nodes are
labeled beforehand: There are three advisors labeled 1, seven ministers labeled 2, and one prime minister
labeled 3.
We modified slightly this network to obtain the influence graph of the second network of Figure 6.
We assume that every communication interaction is an attempt to influence over another student, and
the capacity to influence depends on the student’s position. For instance, the advise of a prime minister
does not have the same effectiveness —marked with weight 3— than the advise of an advisor —marked
with weight 1. Furthermore, as the labels of the nodes should represent the difficulty of each student
i ∈ N to be influenced, according to their position in the Student Government, then they have been
changed by the following values:
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Fig. 6. Student Government discussion network [26,12], and the adaptation to influence graph, where edges are
labeled and the label on nodes have been changed.
– f(i) = 1 if i is an advisor.
– f(i) = ⌈deg−(i)/2⌉ if i is a minister.
– f(i) = deg−(i) if i is the primer minister.
Moreover, for this network we consider a majority influence required to win, i.e., a quota q = 6.
Table 3 shows the results of the centrality measures corresponding to the influence game of the second
network of Figure 6.
Node C−
D
C+
D
CC CB Bz SS CE CS
1 0.2 0.3 0.357 0.130 0.164 0.176 0.91 0.516
2 0.5 0.1 0.200 0.195 0.154 0.076 0.45 0.515
3 0.2 0.6 0.435 0.169 0.164 0.176 0.91 0.516
4 0.7 0.2 0.208 0.204 0.005 0.009 0.55 0.500
5 0.2 0.5 0.238 0.211 0.164 0.176 0.91 0.516
6 0.4 0.5 0.238 0.304 0.164 0.176 0.82 0.516
7 0.6 0.4 0.227 0.316 0.005 0.009 0.64 0.500
8 0.8 0.4 0.227 0.262 0.005 0.009 0.55 0.500
9 0.2 0.4 0.227 0.193 0.005 0.009 0.82 0.500
10 0.0 0.4 0.556 0.111 0.164 0.176 0.91 0.516
11 0.3 0.3 0.227 0.306 0.005 0.009 0.82 0.500
Table 3. Comparison of centrality measures for the influence game version of the Student Government discussion
network. The more central values of the measures are highlighted in bold. We consider a quota q = 6.
Note that for this network, traditional measures provide different rankings. In fact, none of the
most central nodes measured with CC and CB coincide, and while the most central node for CC is the
advisor 10, this is the less central according to CB . Moreover, the ministers 3 and 1 are very central
for CC but with CB are at the bottom of the ranking. This is because nodes 1, 3 and 10 have a high
accessibility to all other nodes, but however, they are not good intermediaries for connecting distant
nodes through paths.
Nevertheless, nodes 1, 3 and 10, as well as ministers 5 and 6, have a high score for measures Bz, SS
and CS , since the spread of the influence over the other students starting from the coalitions where they
participate, is often indispensable to overcome the required quota q. The same is the case for CE , except
for the minister 6, which is a bit less central.
Note that for any measure except CS , the prime minister —node 2— has a relatively low centrality.
According to the measures of power indices, that is because this node has only been reported with
minister 8, on which may have some influence, but he has received many interactions —which we can
11
understand as comments, advice, suggestions, etc.— from other ministers and advisors, exerting a strong
influence on him. On the other hand, his low centrality with CE is explained because he can not influence
any other member by himself, and at the same time his activation requires the most highest effort. Finally,
for CS this is not true because the prime minister belongs to many losing coalitions.
6 Conclusions and future work
Our main motivation in this work was to use influence games, which link spread of influence and decision
theory, as a way to propose additional centrality measures coming from the field of cooperative game
theory. We expect that such measures can be used to explain, up to some extent, the different roles with
respect to social choice under diffusion process in social networks.
We have considered the framework of influence games to derive a connection between social network
analysis and spread of influence in decision processes. Using this link to simple game theory we have
considered four new centrality measures: Banzhaf centrality measure, Shapley-Shubik centrality measure,
Effort centrality measure and Satisfaction centrality measure. As far as we know, this is the first ap-
proach to apply power indices as centrality measures for social networks. Our results do not contradict
the relevance criteria provided by traditional centrality measures like degree centrality, closeness or be-
tweenness. In some cases such measurements are similar to our measurements, returning expected results
for a reasonable measure of centrality. However, there are also cases where the results have been quite
different from traditional measures, which may also differ significantly, as is the case of the Student
Government discussion network, or the Monkeys’ interaction network for the effort centrality measure.
For these cases, new reasonable centrality measures provide new approaches and insights for social net-
work analysis. Moreover, sometimes the new centrality measures are very eloquent for edge-labeled and
vertex-labeled directed graphs, which are not supported by most measures of centrality [6].
Our experiments can be extended to other power indices [21], other measures that consider power
or satisfaction in societies [53,54], or new measures similar or not to the effort measure or the width
measure. Moreover, it is also interesting to define other centrality measures based on the properties of
influence games.
On the other hand, a similar analysis that we have introduced here can be applied to other social
networks like those that exist in databases provided by [41] or [52].
Finally, there are other well known concepts related with players in simple games, such as dummy,
vetoer, dictators, etc. —see [51]— that could be interesting to define as properties of actors in a social
network. It seems that such concepts are closely related with their centrality on the network. For instance,
consider the advisor 10 for the analyzed Student Government discussion network of Section 5.3, with
a quota q = 11 —maximum influence required to win— and let X ⊆ N be a coalition. Therefore, as
deg−(10) = 0, {10} /∈ X implies F (X) < q. In cooperative game theory, this means that here the
advisor 10 is a vetoer [51]: A coalition wins only whether it contains that significant student.
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